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Abstract—Public networks are exposed to port scans from
the Internet. Attackers search for vulnerable services they can
exploit. In large scan campaigns, attackers often utilize different
machines to perform distributed scans, which impedes their
detection and might also camouflage the actual goal of the
scanning campaign. In this paper, we present a correlation
algorithm to detect scans, identify potential relations among
them, and reassemble them to larger campaigns. We evaluate
our approach on real-world Internet traffic and our results
indicate that it can summarize and characterize standalone and
distributed scan campaigns based on their tools and intention.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection, Alert Correlation, Port
Scans, Distributed Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Port scans are used by attackers for reconnaissance to
prepare attacks and to find a viable entrypoint into a target
network or system [1] or to explore an infiltrated network
through lateral movement [2]. For that, attackers try to identify
and enumerate running Internet services by scanning for open
ports on the potential victims. This affects organizations of
any size, including Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and cloud
providers [3]. Therefore, it is important to detect port scans and
to understand the attacker’s perspective to predict consecutive
attack steps that can then be mitigated at an early stage,
especially in the presence of long-running APT attacks [4].
Gaining intelligence about these scans is complicated as
different attackers usually perform overlapping scans in par-
allel, whereas some sophisticated attackers even cooperatively
scan networks from multiple machines making it harder to link
those. To achieve actionable threat intelligence and to be able
to react to unusual or new scanning behavior, a methodology is
needed that captures characteristics of attackers and to enable
the correlation of related scans and distributed scanning nodes.
Our contribution is a methodology to detect port scan
campaigns by correlating scans activity from standalone or
distributed scanners. Our approach is based on the key insight
that scan activity from the same attacker exposes similar
properties, even when accomplished by a coordinated scan
using multiple nodes. Thus, we describe features that identify
related scans in both knowledge obtained by the attacker as
well as the choice of target hosts. Our approach uses these
features to derive similarity scores between single scans and
then applies thresholding to label the resulting clusters as
distributed port scan campaigns.
We evaluate our work on real-world traffic in Internet back-
bone, which contains a broad range of port scans from multiple
attackers. We present our findings on scan campaigns and
especially those that are performed by distributed scanners.
Furthermore, we show that larger distributed campaigns can
already be detected with the visibility of enterprise networks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section II we describe related work. Section III describes our
approach to reveal standalone and distributed scan campaigns.
In Section IV we evaluate our approach and Section V
concludes our paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Apart from reviewing approaches specifically for the detec-
tion of port scans, we also review approaches for correlating
potentially Internet-wide attack information in large network.
a) Port Scan Detection: In [5], Staniford et al. describe
Spice an approach to cluster anomalous packets to port scans.
Spice is focused on long and stealthy port scans that are not
caught by simple detection mechanisms as the single scan
probes just fall out of the detection window. To combat this
the authors do anomaly detection on the packets first and
then keep those with higher scores for longer periods of
time. However, although the authors mention the problem of
colluding scanners and claim that Spice can detect those, it is
not the focus of the approach and partially unclear how they
achieve detection.
Lee et al. [6] propose an approach to detect distributed port
scans. They classify port scans as either vertical (scanning
multiple ports of the same host), horizontal (scanning the same
port on multiple hosts) or block scans (the combination of the
two). We use a similar metric when characterizing the source
and destination ports of attackers. However their definition of
colluding scanners is limited to the source IPs being in the
same /24 subnet to account for decoy or zombie machines.
Our approach uses a larger set of ten distinct features to
calculate similarity between attacking IPs and is thus not
limited to this assumption.
In [7], Gates also developed an approach to detect dis-
tributed port scans. They use a set covering approach based
on a feature set of number of targeted ports, number of
targeted IPs, the selection algorithm for the target IPs and how
additional IPs were scanned to hide the true target, if any. The
author chose this set to model the attackers’ incentives rather978-1-7281-4973-8/20/$31.00 © 2020 IEEE
than specifically defining how a distributed scan looks like.
Our approach is similar but additionally incorporates indicators
for same tools and techniques used in distributed port scans.
Durumeric et al. [8] conduct a real-world measurement on
Internet-wide scanning. For that, they propose heuristics for
recognizing large horizontal scans by leveraging fingerprinting
of well-known scanning tools, including ZMap [9] and Mass-
can. Their results indicate that the current practice of Internet-
wide scanning is indeed mostly horizontal. Furthermore, the
authors analyze the scan campaigns semantically regarding
their goals. In contrast to them, we apply a more flexible
detection approach that focuses on the detection of distributed
scanners that collude in a larger scan campaign.
b) Network-wide Alert Correlation: Feature similarity
– as leveraged by our approach – has been used multiple
times for intrusion detection and more specifically for alert
correlation [10]–[13]. However, common alert clustering as in
GAC [14] is too generic to capture the intrinsic characteristics
of distributed port scans. Scan-specific features are required
for high evidence about colluding scanners or otherwise, the
individual scans are not assembled to a scan campaign.
When dealing with potentially Internet-wide scan cam-
paigns, their detection faces the locality problem [15], i.e.,
the local vision a specific Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
has on the monitored network. To overcome this problem,
the sensors in a Collaborative Intrusion Detection System
(CIDS) [16] exchange data to establish a holistic view on a
larger scope. In particular, the CIDS SkipMon [17] identifies
monitors with similar traffic to group local monitors. However,
traffic similarity is not a sufficient measure to identify similar
scan activity that results from distributed scanners.
III. DETECTION OF SCAN CAMPAIGNS
Massive port scan activity from the Internet results in a sheer
flood of IDS alerts for the scanned hosts and ports. In this
section, we present our alert correlation algorithm to detect
related scan alerts and summarize them as scan campaigns.
For that, the algorithm first characterizes the scan activity
regarding its techniques and intention. Afterwards, scanners
with similar behavior are eventually classified as coordinated
by the same attacker to collectively gain some knowledge
about a target network. The result is a description of scan
campaigns that summarize the holistic scan activity of an
attacker.
A. Port Scan Detection
For the transport protocol TCP, there is an explicit three-way
handshake [18] to initiate a connection-oriented communica-
tion. More generally, with the term connection we refer to a
series of related packets exchanged between two endpoints,
i.e., IP and port tuples. Ideally, the initiator of a connection
reaches out to a service that is known to run behind an
open port on the destination host. This eventually leads to
a successful connection establishment. However, congestion
in the network or downtime of the service can lead to failed
establishments without any malicious intention of the initiator.
Feature Attacker Target Values
Source Ports X [S + p, F , M]
Destination Ports X [S + p, F , M]
Vertical Scan X [true, false + h)]
Horizontal Scan X [true, false]
Scan Validation X [true, false]
IP Version X [v4, v6]
Target Hosts X n ∈ N
Scans Probes X n ∈ N
Source Subnet X h
Source Location X coordinates (x, y)
TABLE I: Key features to characterize scans regarding attacker
(i.e. tool) and target (i.e. intention). Values are absolute num-
bers (N) or in categories of Single (S), Few (F ), Multiple
(M) with an optional concrete port number p or host IP h.
The intention is different and considered malicious if it is
unknown to the initiator whether a service is usually running
on a specific IP and port tuple. We denote a single connection
attempt to a specific IP:Port to verify the port status as a
scan probe. A successful connection proves an open port and
therefore a running service. However, most of the guessed
ports are probably closed, resulting in failed establishments.
Thus, we define a malicious source IP that sends scan probes
as a scanning node (scanner). The term port scan describes all
scan probes of a specific scanner. An IDS usually reports such
failed connection attempts as port scan alerts when exceeding
a threshold.
Typically, many ports and hosts are scanned by an attacker
in a scan campaign to gain a particular knowledge about
a target network. To achieve this goal, multiple machines
can work together as distributed scanners. Their individually
gained knowledge is collectively assembled with respect to the
intention of the campaign.
B. Characterizing Port Scans
The scan of a target network can be characterized out of two
perspectives: (1) the information that is gained about the target
and (2) the techniques used to retrieve the information. This is
reflected by the scan intention and the technical tools for the
scan campaign, respectively. In general, we assume attackers to
continuously use the same technical tools while scanning and
therefore to show a consistent behavior during a campaign. To
perform large campaigns, distributed scanners scan the target
network faster or to stay undetected by coordinating their scan
activity in a distributed fashion [19].
In the following, we present ten key features that char-
acterize a port scan, i.e., the respective tool used and the
attacker’s intention. Intuitively, similarity of these features
among scans indicate a relation among them. For large sets of
scan alerts, these features are evaluated for each scanner. They
are summarized in Table I and utilized in the second step of
our algorithm to correlate port scans.
a) Source and Destination Ports: The involved ports
during a scan are of interest because of two reasons. First,
the destination port is directly related to the intention of the
scan. Second, the usage of the source port across port scans
contributes to fingerprinting the scan tool of the attacker.
Instead of only looking at actual ports p, we also assign source
and destination ports a category depending on the number
of different ports. The label Single (S) is for a single port,
Few (F ) for 2 to X ports, and Multiple (M) for more than
X ports. The similarity between source ports and destination
ports respectively, is 0 when the categories mismatch. Upon
a match, the similarity is 1 in general. However, for Single
ports, we also require the port number p to match, otherwise
the similarity is 0.5.
b) Vertical and Horizontal Scans: An indirect character-
istic of the scan intention is regarding the number of different
hosts and the number of different ports. If scans encompass
more than one target hosts, it is classified as vertical. If scans
encompass more than one port on the same target host, it is
classified as horizontal. The similarity of 1 when comparing
the vertical and horizontal property respectively, requires a
match. The similarity is 0 otherwise. When the scans target
a single hosts, i.e., no vertical scans, we additionally enforce
the probes of both scanners to target the exact same host h.
c) Scan Validation: Not only legitimate connections
sometimes break or fail because of technical reasons, also
scans eventually fail in detecting a running service although
the respective port is open. To compensate false-negative scan
results because of packet loss during the scan, scanning tools
might try several attempts for the same host and port. Thus,
we classify scanners to validate their scan results when they
perform more than one scan attempt per host and port. Same
classifications for two scans lead to a similarity of 1 and is 0
otherwise.
d) IP Version: We differentiate the IP protocol versions
4 and 6. The version has to match when comparing two attacks
for a similarity of 1. It is 0 on a mismatch.
e) Magnitude of Target Hosts and Scans Probes: Espe-
cially in well coordinated scan campaigns, the scan activity is
equally distributed among powerful scanner machines. When
each scanner contributes equally to the knowledge gain, they
scan the same amount of hosts and ports, respectively. For
statistical and operational reasons, it is unlikely to see the
scan activity being perfectly distributed among the scanners.
Thus, the similarity of scanned hosts and ports between two
port scans is not based on the absolute number n ∈ N, but
on the order of magnitude. For that, the difference between
two numbers a, b must be smaller than the smaller number,
i.e. |a− b| < min(a, b). In that case, the similarity is 1 and 0
otherwise.
f) Source IP Subnet and Geolocation: Another indicator
for distributed scanners is the proximity between them. This
is eventually with respect to organizational or geographical
location. Although this does not apply when utilizing a botnet
with infected machines around the globe, is likely when using
the servers of a specific provider or data center. For that, we
leverage the source IP of the attacker and the coordinates of
its geolocation. Ideally, we would check if two attacker IPs
belong to the same subnet, if known. Instead, we generically
calculate a linear similarity between 0 and 1 depending on the
number of equal leading bits in the IP. If two IPs have the
same prefix of length 27 bits, their similarity is 0.84. For the
geolocation, we differentiate between country and coordinates.
If coordinates only differ in few degrees, the similarity is 1.
The similarity is 0.5 if the coordinates are still in the same
country and 0 for different countries.
C. Correlating Port Scans
Based on the characterization of port scans according to the
ten key features from Section III-B, we are able to fingerprint
scanners and their scans with respect to tools and intention.
In the following, we describe the second algorithm part to
correlate scanners are coordinated in a scan campaign.
First, we filter false-positive scan alerts that are likely
caused by legitimate reasons that happen from time to time.
In contrast, malicious port scans cause many connections to
fail as they have to probe many hosts and ports to gain the
desired knowledge. Thus, we introduce the threshold ǫ that is
the minimum number or scan probes in a port scan. If less,
the respective suspicious IP is filtered and not considered for
the correlation of port scans.
Two scanners are believed coordinated if the similarity of
their fingerprints exceed a threshold t. The similarity over the
ten key feature is defined as a weighted average:
sim =
∑
10
i=1
s(i) ∗ w(i)
∑
10
i=1
w(i)
For that, we compare each of the ten features pair-wise for
two port scans. The feature similarity s(i) for the features
i ∈ [1; 10] is in the range between 0 and 1. To prioritize certain
features that indicate distributed scanners with higher certainty,
features can be assigned weights w(i) when calculating the
similarity among port scans that is 0 ≤ sim ≤ 1. The threshold
t controls if two scans are similar enough regarding their tools
and intention to be assumed to belong to the same campaign.
To find distributed scanners in a large scan alert set based
on their similarity sim, we leverage hierarchical clustering.
This type of clustering benefits from its parameterization
as no prediction about number of clusters or their sizes is
required. Instead, we incorporate the threshold t that allows
to interactively inspect the resulting clusters when varying this
parameter. In particular, we leverage the clustering algorithm
Unweighted Pair Group Method with Arithmetic mean (UP-
GMA [20]) for two reasons. First, the bottom-up property
of this clustering algorithm ensures that the most similar
scans become clustered first. Second, UPGMA recalculates
similarities of merged clusters by averaging the similarities
of all contained elements. As most of the key features have
only few possible values (cf. Table I), this tries to preserve
the clusters dominating features when searching new elements
to merge. It results in a campaign description that allows to
derive an explanation why certain scans have been clustered,
i.e. what their most common features are.
IV. EVALUATION
The evaluation of detecting port scan campaigns is per-
formed on real-world Internet traffic. First, we investigate the
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Fig. 1: Distribution for number of unique scanned ports among the attackers
data set and the effect of the parameters in our detection.
Then, we highlight some of the detected scan campaigns.
Furthermore, we investigate the detection accuracy from the
perspective of the backbone infrastructure, an ISP, and an
enterprise.
A. Data Set
We first describe the full data set and how we process
it to detect port scans. Afterwards, we restrict the network
visibility in the data set to reflect the scope for different levels
of network providers.
Scope Subnet Scan Probes Scanners
Backbone 0.0.0.0/0 9,960,652 199,403
ISP 133.242.0.0/16 2,228,873 67,929
Enterprise 133.242.179.0/24 13,598 1,070
TABLE II: Port Scan statistics for full data set and simulated
network operators
a) Evaluation Data and Tools: We use a network traffic
captured by the MAWILab project [21]. They monitor a transit
cable between the USA and Japan. For anonymity reasons,
only IP and TCP/UDP headers are recorded in the network
trace. In addition, the last byte of an IP address is randomized
consistently among the data set. This potentially effects the
key features for the IP and geolocation similarity. However,
as the address modification is at the last byte only, the distance
between two IPs changes only marginally and the geolocation
stays most likely unchanged.
We use the network monitor and IDS Zeek [22] to analyze
the network capture for TCP port scans, i.e., incomplete
TCP establishments. For that, Zeek implements a connec-
tion tracking that identifies an incomplete TCP three-way
handshake [18], e.g., because the destination port is closed
or the connection remained half opened. Apart from rare
technical reasons like misconfigurations, this usually indicates
an attacker that is only interested in discovering open ports, but
not in establishing a full connection. In the MAWILab capture
of 15 minutes on May, 5th 2019, Zeek detects 9, 960, 652 scan
probes from 199, 403 scanners to 265, 081 targets.
b) Restricting Network Visibility: The MAWILab capture
and therefore the detection of the port scans are in the scope of
an Internet backbone, as the traffic was recorded from a transit
cable. This reflects our ground truth with all the hosts in the
data set. Hence, the full data set is the benchmark comparison
when it comes to the detection of scan campaigns from the
perspective of targeted networks. Different to the holistic view
on the scan campaign from the perspective of the Internet
backbone, a targeted network might only be one of many
targets in the campaign and therefore has only a limited view
on the campaign.
To simulate smaller networks, we restrict the visibility
of the monitoring and scan correlation to a fraction of IP
addresses, i.e., an IP subnet in the full data set. Consequently,
the restricted data sets contain only incoming and outgoing
communication with respect to the monitored subnet. Apart
from the backbone scope, we simulate the scope of an ISP
and an enterprise. For the respective subnets, we chose IP
addresses that received a lot of scans. The resulting three data
sets of different scopes are summarized in Table II.
B. Parameter Study
In this section, we discuss the most influencing parameters
for the detection of port scan campaigns. First, we analyze
the threshold ǫ to filter false-positive scan alerts. Although the
average are 50 probes per scanner, about 90% of the scanners
cause 15 or less probes. Consequently, there exists a few
scanners that cause hundreds of probes. For example, for ǫ = 5
only 30% of the scanners are left but they still count for 96% of
scan probes. For ǫ = 100 even the remaining 1.26% scanners
count for 88% of probes. Generally, this distribution supports
our assumption that technical failures occur and results in
many false-positive scan alerts that can easily be filtered with
a small ǫ.
Figure 1 plots the distribution of ports among the attackers
to decide on the parameter X that is the threshold between
the classes Few and Multiple. Figure 1a shows how many
attackers scan a unique number of ports or use a unique
number of ports, respectively. It looks close to a exponential
Campaign from Netherlands Campaign from France
Enterprise ISP Backbone Enterprise ISP Backbone
Scan Probes 2449 450, 489 1, 812, 160 20 4, 479 18, 259
Source Ports S + 46960 and S + 55776 S + 30443
Destination Ports M S + 30443
Vertical Scan true true and false true
Horizontal Scan true false
Scan Validation false false
IP version IPv4 IPv4
Target Hosts 256 and 248 65, 205 and 53, 011 260, 299 and 211, 552 1 to 3 145 to 196 591 to 799
Port Scans 1747 and 702 343, 609 and 106, 880 1, 382, 844 and 429, 316 1 to 3 145 to 196 591 to 799
Source Subnet
2 15 27 27
addresses in 185.173.217.208/28 addresses in 88.138.143.0/27
Source Location Netherlands France
TABLE III: Summary of two campaigns for different network scopes
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Fig. 2: Resulting clusters depending on the parameter t
distribution. We set X = 10 in further experiments, as for
the shape for the distribution function changes around this
point. Figure 1b illustrates the resulting classes for ports when
applying the parameters ǫ = 100 and X = 10.
We design the similarity weights w(i) with respect to how
strongly similar features i indicate related port scans. We
assign the features three different weights as follows. The
strongest weight of 4 is for the two ports. Medium strength
with a weight of 2 is assigned to the vertical and horizontal
property, scan verification, and source IP and location. The
lowest weight of 1 is assigned to the IP version, and the order
of magnitude for target hosts and scan probes.
The effect of the parameter t for the cutoff in hierarchical
clustering is illustrated in Figure 2. We set t = 0.15 as a
reasonable value which is in between two points where the
shape significantly changes.
Next, we analyze the resulting clusters, i.e., scan campaigns,
for the parameters X = 10, ǫ between 0 and 10, and t = 0.15.
C. Campaign Characteristics
Applying the correlation of port scans (cf. Section III-C) on
our data set, results in the campaigns summarized in Table IV.
As the simulated scope of an ISP and enterprise network
restricts the visibility, the number of port scans decreases to
23% and 0.14% respectively compared to the ground truth in
the backbone scope. Consequently, also the number of detected
campaigns decreases to 10% and 0.76%, respectively.
Scope
Filter
Scans Attackers Campaigns
Distributed
ǫ Scanners
Backbone 10 9,401,543 27,244 1955 19,373 (71%)
ISP 5 2,130,215 8,617 717 2828 (33%)
Enterprise 0 13,598 1070 32 208 (20%)
TABLE IV: Summary of campaign detection for clustering
parameter t = 0.15 for different network scopes
While the decrease of attackers, scanned ports, and cam-
paigns is directly caused by the restricted visibility scope, it is
of interest how this effects the correlation of monitored scans
to campaigns. The fraction of scanners that are coordinated,
indicates that the detection rate suffers from a restricted moni-
toring scope. However, this is eventually mostly caused by the
nature of restricted visibility, especially when the campaign is
not targeting our simulated subnet in particular but it is a broad
Internet scan.
Out of the 1955 detected campaigns, we look at two specific
ones. They represent many other campaigns that we found
in the data set. Even though these two are not of more
interest than others, we picked them to exemplary highlight
the clustering outcome as summary of a scan campaign. In
particular, we look at the outcome of the same two campaigns
on all three network scopes. The fingerprints of the campaigns
are shown in Table III. Apart from the number of scan probes,
the table lists the values of the ten key features with respect
to Table I. This illustrates feature values that are equal for all
visibility scopes and others that differ among the scopes.
The two examples show campaigns from Netherlands and
from France. The key features show that many values are
equal among the distributed scanners. Especially that in the
France campaign 27 out of 32 possible IP addresses in the
88.138.143.0/27 network show the same scanning properties,
is a very strong indication for their coordination. For the
Netherlands campaign, we see only two scanners that most
probably belong to the same organizational subnet. Although
the two different source ports might not be intuitive, from the
classification for using a single source port only we derive
that the scan tool uses a static port that is not hard-coded but
chosen at run-time. In case of these two example campaigns,
we have seen that the correlation of distributed scanners is
likely to be successful as long as a sufficiently large number
of scan activities from a particular campaign is monitored.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an approach to detect port
scan campaigns that potentially deploy distributed scanners.
For that, our correlation algorithm for scan alerts detects and
fingerprints port scans and identifies those that belong to the
same campaign. We presented key features to characterize port
scans and to summarize a scan campaign. The evaluation on
real-world Internet traffic gives insights into the parameteriza-
tion of our correlation algorithm and into common patterns of
port scans. Furthermore, the results highlight the detection of
distributed scanners and how the size of the monitored network
effects the detection performance. The results indicate that also
small and medium networks can detect scan campaigns on
their own when a majority of their hosts is affected. Future
work can identify more features that are either directly avail-
able in the packets like the Time To Live (TTL) field or derived
like the Autonomous System Number (ASN). Furthermore, the
detection of scan campaigns can leverage expert knowledge
about fingerprints of well-known scanning tools.
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